After the failure of the U.S. invasion of Playa Girón and the terrible experience of the October Crisis of 1962, J.F. Kennedy, apparently convinced that it was not intelligent at that time to try to change the Cuban regime by direct military means, began to evaluate a wide spectrum of tactics where the strategic interests of the United States were equally satisfied.
Among the wide range of options being discussed as possible courses of action, the US president agreed to explore, cautiously and discreetly, a possible modus vivendi with the island, but first he needed to know what concessions Cuba was willing to make if some kind of accommodation was achieved. At the same time, the decision of the USSR to withdraw the rockets without counting on the Cubans and the displeasure of the island’s leadership with such an attitude, seemed to show Kennedy a gap between Cubans and Soviets that was worth exploiting. Also a possible arrangement with Cuba was very well in tune with Kennedy’s intentions to build a peace structure with the USSR at that time. “As for Kennedy,” Schlesinger wrote, “his feelings underwent a qualitative change after Cuba (the October Crisis of 1962); A world in which nations threatened each other with nuclear weapons now seemed to him not exactly an irrational world, but an intolerable and impossible world. Thus, Cuba aroused the feeling that this world had a common interest in avoiding nuclear war, an interest that was far above those national and ideological interests that at one time may have seemed crucial.” [1]
In his famous speech at American University in June 1963, Kennedy made a strong call for world peace and reexamined the American attitude toward the USSR.
“No nation in history,” he said, “has suffered more than the Soviet Union in the course of World War II. If the world war were to return again, everything that both sides have built, everything that we have fought for, would be destroyed in the first twenty-four hours. However, both of us are sheltered in a dangerous and vicious circle, in which suspicion on one side feeds suspicion on the other, and new weapons give rise to others to counter them.
(…)
If we cannot now put an end to all our differences, we can at least contribute to maintaining the diversity of the world. Well, ultimately, the fundamental bond that binds us is that we all inhabit this small planet. We all breathe the same air. We all cherish our children’s future. And we are all mortal.”[2]
Steps such as the signing of a treaty with the USSR on the prohibition of nuclear tests, the establishment of the so-called “red telephone” for direct communication in cases of urgency between the Kremlin and the White House and the US authorization to sell surplus wheat production to the Soviet Union, contributed to establishing a climate of relaxation of tensions between the two great adversary powers during the course of 1963. Of course, all this had its impact on U.S. policy toward Cuba.
The efforts of James Donovan
The negotiations for the return to the United States of 1,200 mercenaries, imprisoned in Cuba after the invasion of Girón, had opened the first channel of communication between the two countries since the rupture of relations. James Donovan, a New York attorney charged with negotiating the release of the Bay of Pigs prisoners as legal counsel to the Committee of Relatives,[3] he became the first transmitter of Fidel’s willingness – with whom he met on several occasions – to resolve the bilateral conflict.
El gobierno de Estados Unidos manejó el asunto de los prisioneros de Bahía de Cochinos de manera muy discreta, evitando en todo momento dar la imagen de que negociaba con el gobierno cubano. Todo debía parecer una gestión privada.[4]
Fue a mediados de junio de 1962, que a pedido del fiscal general, Robert Kennedy, el Comité de Familiares de los Prisioneros le solicitó al abogado James Donovan que los representara en las gestiones con el gobierno cubano para liberarlos mediante el pago que los Tribunales Revolucionarios exigían por cada uno de ellos. A finales de agosto de 1962 Donovan viajó a la Isla y sostuvo su primera conversación con el Comandante en Jefe. Las gestiones de Donovan con las autoridades cubanas continuarían hasta diciembre de ese año cuando se llegó al acuerdo definitivo. Solo serían interrumpidas durante el período de la Crisis de Octubre.
Mientras las conversaciones Donovan-Castro tenían lugar, la CIA preparó un plan para que Donovan llevara al líder de la Revolución Cubana un equipo de buceo manipulado por la agencia para atentar contra la vida del dirigente cubano. Los implementos para respirar habían sido contaminados con bacilos de tuberculosis y el traje de inmersión estaba impregnado con los hongos que producen el “Pie de Madura” (maduramicosis), una enfermedad que comienza atacando las extremidades inferiores, aflorando como tumefacciones y fístulas, y penetrando –hasta destruirlos- músculos, tendones y huesos. Como Donovan bajo iniciativa propia ya le había regalado a Fidel un traje de buceo, el plan fue abandonado.[5]
Pesca en Playa Girón durante el viaje con Donovan.
Donovan continuó reuniéndose con Fidel en el año 1963, pero en este caso para gestionar la liberación de varios ciudadanos estadounidenses presos en la Isla. El abogado neoyorquino reportó a Washington el deseo de Fidel y de algunos de sus más próximos asesores en mejorar las relaciones con Estados Unidos.
Kennedy reaccionó con interés ante todos informes de las conversaciones Donovan-Fidel. Incluso, en marzo de 1963, ante la propuesta de uno de sus colaboradores de trasladarle a Fidel por intermedio de Donavan el mensaje de que solo dos cosas eran no negociables: (1) los lazos de Cuba con el bloque chino-soviético y (2) su interferencia en el Hemisferio, asombrosamente el presidente estadounidense indicó que no estaba de acuerdo en convertir esta exigencia del “(…) rompimiento de los lazos chino-soviéticos” un punto no negociable. “No queremos presentarnos ante Castro con una condición que obviamente él no puede cumplir. Debemos comenzar pensando en líneas más flexibles”, expresó Kennedy.[6]
Donovan viajó a Cuba entre el 5 y el 8 de abril, para continuar sus negociaciones con las autoridades cubanas, que tuvieron como resultado la liberación de los agentes norteamericanos. En un memorando enviado a Kennedy sobre estas conversaciones, el director de la CIA expresó que el propósito central de esos contactos -más allá de la liberación de los agentes norteamericanos- había sido político y estaba dirigido a sondear la posición de las autoridades cubanas sobre las relaciones con Estados Unidos. McCone informó además a Kennedy que el ayudante de Fidel Castro, René Vallejo, le había dicho a Donovan que el líder cubano “(…) sabía que las relaciones con Estados Unidos eran necesarias y que quería estas se desarrollaran”.[7]
El 10 de abril, Kennedy conversó en privado con McCone acerca del contenido del memorando antes citado. El Presidente expresó gran interés por las conversaciones de Donovan con las autoridades cubanas y formuló varias preguntas “acerca del futuro de Castro en Cuba, con o sin la presencia soviética”. McCone declaró que el asunto “(…) se hallaba en estudio y propuso enviar a Donovan de vuelta a Cuba, el 22 de abril, para asegurar la liberación de los prisioneros y mantener abierto el canal de comunicación”.[8]
Discusión de los posibles cursos de acción con relación a Cuba
El 11 de abril de 1963, Gordon Chase, quien se desempeñaba como asistente de McGeorge Bundy, había señalado en memorándum enviado a este último, que todos estaban preocupados por solucionar el problema cubano, pero que hasta ese momento solo habían tratado de resolverlo a través de “maldades abiertas y encubiertas de diversa magnitud”, obviando la otra cara de la moneda: “atraer suavemente a Castro hacia nosotros”. Chase expuso a Bundy sus consideraciones de que, si la “dulce aproximación a Cuba” tenía resultado, los beneficios para Estados Unidos serían sustanciales.
“Probablemente –sostenía Chase- pudiéramos neutralizar a corto plazo por lo menos dos de nuestras principales preocupaciones en relación con Castro: la reintroducción de los misiles ofensivos y la subversión cubana. A largo plazo, podríamos trabajar en la eliminación de Castro a nuestra conveniencia y desde una posición de ventaja”.[9]
Asimismo, Chase planteó a Bundy que los dos obstáculos que se divisaban frente a este posible giro político con relación a Cuba: el rechazo interno de la opinión pública estadounidense y la renuencia de Fidel a dejarse seducir, eran difíciles, pero no imposibles de superar.
De esta manera, hacia abril de 1963, la administración Kennedy analizaba todas las variantes que pudieran resolver el “problema cubano”, lo cual se convirtió prácticamente en una obsesión del presidente hasta el fatídico 22 de noviembre de 1963. Junto con las propuestas de espionaje, guerra económica, sabotaje encubierto, presiones diplomáticas y planes de contingencia militar, en los documentos ultrasecretos del Consejo de Seguridad Nacional de Estados Unidos se incluía la posibilidad de “un desarrollo gradual de cierta forma de arreglo con Castro”. En un memorándum sobre “El problema cubano”, fechado el 21 de abril, McGeorge Bundy explicó la lógica de este tipo de iniciativa: “Siempre existe la posibilidad de que Castro u otros que actualmente ocupan altos cargos en el régimen vean alguna ventaja en un viraje gradual de su actual dependencia de Moscú. En términos estrictamente económicos, tanto Estados Unidos como Cuba tienen mucho que ganar con el restablecimiento de las relaciones. Un Castro “Titoísta” no es algo inconcebible, y una revolución diplomática total no sería el suceso más extraordinario del siglo XX”.[10]
El 30 de abril de 1963, en una reunión del Grupo Permanente, se acordó “mantener la línea de comunicación con Castro que había abierto el señor Donovan durante las negociaciones de los prisioneros norteamericanos”.[11] Pero por esa fecha se abriría otro importante canal de comunicación entre ambos gobiernos a través de la periodista Lisa Howard. [12]La bella reportera había sido presentada a Fidel por Donovan en el transcurso del propio mes de abril, quien además le había gestionado una entrevista con el líder cubano para la ABC. La entrevista, de una hora de duración, sería trasmitida en Estados Unidos el 10 de mayo de 1963 y generaría titulares como: “Castro quiere hablar con Kennedy” y “Castro da indicios de que quiere negociar con Kennedy”.[13]A su regreso a Estados Unidos, Lisa Howard informó a la CIA el interés del líder de la Revolución Cubana de conversar con la administración Kennedy. El Subdirector de Planes de la CIA, Richard Helms, elaboró un memorándum con la información recopilada de la entrevista para McCone, con copia para el Fiscal General; el asistente especial del Presidente para Asuntos de Seguridad Nacional; y otros altos mandos del aparato de inteligencia. Helms concluyó sus valoraciones de la siguiente manera: “Lisa Howard definitivamente quiere impresionar al gobierno de los Estados Unidos con dos hechos: Castro está preparado para analizar el reacercamiento y ella misma está preparada para debatir el asunto con él si el gobierno de los Estados Unidos se lo solicita”. [14]
Entretanto, una comunicación enviada a Robert Kennedy el 2 de mayo por instrucciones de McCone, daba testimonio de las preocupaciones que asistían al Director de la CIA ante cualquier iniciativa que significase un acercamiento al régimen cubano. También mostraba su falta de interés y voluntad política para avanzar en ese camino. “A propósito del informe de Lisa Howard –señalaba el documento-, Mr. McCone sent me a cable this morning, stating that he cannot overemphasize the importance of secrecy in this matter and requested that I take all appropriate steps in this regard to reflect his personal view of his sensibilities. Mr. McCone perceives that the rumor and inevitable leaks with their consequent publicity would be the most damaging. He suggests that no active steps be taken on the issue of reconciliation at this time and urges the most limited discussions in Washington. In these circumstances, it should be emphasized in every discussion that the path of reconciliation is being explored as a remote possibility and one of several alternatives that involves several levels of dynamic and positive action.” [15]
The beginning of secret diplomacy
It was not until June 6, 1963, that the Permanent Group extensively evaluated the subject of James Donovan’s conversations with Fidel Castro and the other intelligence reports that indicated Cuba’s interest in improving its relations with the United States. Information that had been coming repeatedly in 1963 through various CIA sources. In this meeting, the different ways to establish channels of communication with the leader of the Cuban Revolution were valued and the group agreed that this was a useful effort.[16]We would have to wait until September for the contacts to begin to materialize.[17] and in this Lisa Howard would play a catalytic role.
In September 1963, Howard told William Attwood,[18] A Kennedy administration official attached to the U.S. mission to the United Nations, Fidel Castro, with whom he had met for several hours during his visit to Havana, had expressed his willingness to establish some kind of communication with the U.S. government and willingness to explore a modus vivendi. Coincidentally, this same criterion had also been transferred to Atwood by the Guinean ambassador in Havana, Seydon Diallo. Atwood had also read Howard’s interesting article in the liberal War/Peace Report, under the title “Castro’s Overture,” where the journalist pointed out that in 8 hours of interview with Fidel, he had been even more emphatic about his desire to hold negotiations with the United States.[19] As a result, Atwood and Howard would set in motion a plan to initiate secret talks between the United States and Cuba.
Enthusiastic about the idea of establishing some kind of rapprochement between Havana and Washington, Atwood discussed the matter on September 12, 1963 with Assistant Secretary of State Averell Harriman, who suggested that he write a memorandum on the subject. Attwood wasted no time and six days later he had the document ready. It began:
“This memorandum proposes a course of action that, if successful, could remove the issue of Cuba from the 1964 (U.S. presidential) campaign.”
“It does not propose to offer a ‘deal’ to Castro,” he went on to say, “which from a political point of view would be more dangerous than doing nothing, but a discreet investigation into the possibility of neutralizing Cuba according to our own interests…
Since we do not intend to overthrow the Castro regime by military force, is there anything we can do to advance U.S. interests without being accused of appeasement?
According to neutral diplomats and others with whom I have spoken at the United Nations and Guinea, there is reason to believe that Castro does not like his current dependence on the Soviet bloc; that he does not like being actually a satellite; whereas the trade embargo harms it, although not enough to jeopardise its position; and that he would like to have some official contact with the United States and would do much to obtain a normalization of relations with us, even if the majority of his communist entourage, such as Che Guevara, did not welcome him.
All of this may not be true, but it would seem that we have something to gain and nothing to lose by finding out whether Castro really wants to talk and what concessions he would be willing to make…
At the moment, all I would like is authority to make contact with (Carlos) Lechuga (the head of Cuba’s mission to the United Nations). We’ll see what happens then.”[20]
It was practically impossible that, under this vision reflected in the Atwood memorandum, any kind of arrangement could be reached between the United States and Cuba. The proposal was reduced to sounding out the island, to see if it was willing to make a series of gestures and concessions to the United States. Apparently, the US official forgot that the Cuban leaders had already established their position of rejection of any form of negotiation that implied the undermining of the self-determination of the island. Nor is it absurd to think that the Cuban leadership, perceiving Washington’s maneuver, would take advantage of the dialogue process with a view to gaining time and preparing the country politically and militarily for an eventual direct military confrontation with the Yankees.
In this way, the purpose of the tenuous approaches to Cuba that the United States would initiate with the consent of Kennedy, had been perfectly delineated in the Attwood memorandum: to neutralize Cuba according to the interests of the United States, extracting as many concessions as possible. Of course, these concessions implied that Cuba had to begin meeting Washington’s demands regarding “the evacuation of all military personnel from the Soviet bloc,” “an end to Cuba’s subversive activities in Latin America,” and “Cuba’s adoption of a policy of non-alignment.” Were it not under these conditions, the United States would not risk exploring a modus vivendi with Cuba.
Attwood showed the memo himself on Sept. 18 to then-U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Adlai Stevenson, who pledged to discuss the matter with the president. “When I first spoke to him about this initiative or approach of the Cubans to Adlai Stevenson,” Atwood recalled before a U.S. Senate committee in 1975., he said he liked it but,… unfortunately the CIA was still in charge of Cuba. However, he said, he was willing to discuss the matter with the White House.”[21]
The next day, Atwood met Harriman again in New York and handed him the memo. The deputy secretary of state, after reading the document, suggested that Attwood discuss it with Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy as well. But the day after this meeting, Stevenson had obtained the president’s approval for Attwood to maintain discreet contact with the Cuban ambassador to the United Nations, Carlos Lechuga. Immediately, Attwood spoke to Lisa Howard to prepare contact with Lettuce. In the middle of the United Nations delegates’ room, Howard approached Lechuga on September 23 and, as Lechuga himself recalls, told him that Atwood wanted to talk to him and that it was something urgent because the next day he had to leave for Washington.[22]
The meeting took place at the journalist’s house on the night of September 23, quite informally and without seeming an official approach from the United States – as Atwood himself had requested – taking advantage of a party that she prepared and to which she invited Lechuga.[23]Immediately, the Cuban ambassador informed Havana:
“I had the interview with William Atwood. He told me it had been authorized by Stevenson. He is going to Washington today to talk to Kennedy and ask for authorization to go to Cuba to talk with Fidel and explore the possibilities of negotiations if they accept in Cuba that he give the trip. We agreed that I did not raise the matter formally with you until he had Washington’s authorization, but it is obvious that he knows that I would communicate it immediately. That was my approach so that at all times the initiative came from them, as it really is, but in this diplomatic business one learns a lot. His journey would be incognito. Like me, at all times we clarified that we were speaking personally, pending the instructions of both governments. His idea is that the situation between the two countries is abnormal and that someone at one point had to break the ice.
(…)
He says that Kennedy, on many occasions and in private conversations, has said that he does not know how to change the policy toward Cuba. He recognizes that neither they nor we can change politics overnight because it is a question of prestige and that it is difficult, but something has to be done that something has to start. He recognizes that the internal political question is difficult for them because the Republicans always have them on the defensive on the Cuban question.
(…)
Atwood speaking of Bob Kennedy says that he is an individual of hard positions but that he is a politician and sees things objectively. He says he wants to always win. He said this in the sense that, if he considers that the prolongation of the policy towards Cuba is going to give him a negative result in the long run, he changes his position.
(…)
Atwood asked me about the possibility of the Cuban government allowing me to go to Cuba to explore possibilities. I told him I thought so, although I couldn’t give him any categorical opinion. He asked me if I believed there was a 50 percent chance that yes and a 50 percent chance that I wouldn’t. I replied that that was the perfect formula for my answer. When asked by him about the conditions for negotiations, I said that in this area I could not tell him anything, although I could explain my very personal opinion, and that was that it was difficult to negotiate anything with the situation of pressure on Cuba; with the embargo, infiltrations, illegal flights, etc., etc., he told me that the situation was very complex and he understood it, but that someone someday, sometime, had to start something and that he believed that even to listen to what I had just told him in the personal order it would be fruitful to try a rapprochement with Cuba. [24]
Years later, on July 10, 1975, before the Church Commission of the United States Senate, Atwood recalled her contact with Lechuga as follows: “… Miss Howard arranged the reception for the 23rd. I met Lettuce. He said that Fidel Castro had hoped to have been able to maintain contact with President Kennedy in ’61, but then the Bay of Pigs had happened and it was no longer possible. But he had been very impressed by the speech given by the President in June of ’63, in which he referred to diversity in the world. It was then that I told him that I was no longer a private individual but a government official and we agreed that the situation was different, although the circumstances were also a bit anomalous. He told me that the Cubans were very upset with the exile position, the CIA’s position on Cuba, as well as the freezing of Cuban assets.”[25]
The next step was a visit by Atwood to Washington in September to meet with Robert Kennedy. Atwood informed the Attorney General of the initiative and he stated his position that “a trip by Atwood to Cuba, as Lechuga had suggested, would be a bit risky, because it would surely leak and could stop at an investigation in Congress, or something similar (…) but he considered it worthwhile to continue with the matter through the UN and indicated that he would talk to Averell Hariman and Bundy about the subject. ” [26]
In this way, the first contact of Atwood and Lechuga was followed by others in the United Nations delegates’ room. In one of them, Atwood conveyed to Lechuga that the United States government, after evaluating the proposal, had decided that it was not convenient for him to travel to Cuba in those circumstances due to the danger of leakage given his “official status.”[27] but that his government was in the best disposition to meet with Fidel or some of his emissaries at the United Nations. On October 28, Lechuga told Attwood that Havana did not think sending someone to the United Nations would be useful at that time, but that he hoped they could follow up contacts between them.[28] From the White House, Gordon Chase, appointed by Bundy, was in charge of following up on Atwood’s contacts with the Cubans.
Later, Lisa Howard offered her house for Atwood to talk directly with Fidel Castro through her assistant René Vallejo. Also so that through her, Vallejo transferred messages to Atwood.[29]
On October 31, in a call Vallejo made to Lisa Howard, he conveyed the message that Fidel was willing to send a plane to Mexico to pick up an envoy from Washington and drive him to a secret airport near Varadero, where he would have a one-on-one meeting with the leader of the Cuban Revolution. Lisa Howard responded that she doubted that was possible and that perhaps the best thing was for him (Vallejo), as Fidel’s personal spokesman, to travel to the United Nations or Mexico to meet with a representative of the United States government.
Atwood recounted in 1975 how the attention that the highest authorities of the US government paid to their contacts with Cuba grew rapidly. On November 5, he was called to the White House to speak with Bundy, who told him that “the President was more in favor of pushing for an opening with Cuba than the State Department, with the idea of taking it out of the Soviet fold, perhaps erasing what happened at the Bay of Pigs, and maybe returning to normalcy.”[30]Bundy wanted a chronological memo of the entire initiative.
On November 11, Vallejo telephoned Lisa Howard and reiterated Fidel’s interest in meeting with a U.S. emissary and that, in that case, a Cuban plane could pick up the person designated by the U.S. government in Key West and transfer him to one of the airports near Havana where he would participate in a meeting with Fidel. When Atwood communicated this to Bundy, he was told that, on the President’s instructions, he (Atwood) should first make contact with Vallejo at the United Nations to find out what Fidel had in mind, particularly if he was interested in discussing the points made by Stevenson in his speech at the United Nations on October 7. considered unacceptable by the United States:[31] the “submission of Cuba to external communist influence”, “the Cuban campaign aimed at subverting the rest of the hemisphere” and “the non-fulfillment of the promises of the Revolution regarding constitutional rights”. This was also expressed by Bundy in a memorandum to put on record: “without having indications of a willingness to go in that direction, it is difficult to see what we could achieve with a visit to Cuba.”[32]
Attwood transmitted the message to Vallejo by telephone on November 18, who replied that it was not possible for him to travel to New York at that time, but that instead, instructions would be sent to Lechuga to discuss with him (Attwood) an agenda with a view to a later meeting with Fidel. The next day, Atwood reported her conversation to Gordon Chase by phone.[33] Bundy’s assistant then told Atwood that, after receiving the call from Lechuga to set an appointment in which the agenda would be analyzed, she should quickly contact him, since the President wanted to know immediately the result of the conversation to consider the next step that the administration should take.
Chase, who has become one of the greatest defenders of diplomatic rapprochement with Cuba, presented on November 12 in a highly confidential memorandum – only to be read by Bundy – his refutations against several arguments against “conciliation with Castro” such as: “Castro will never satisfy our minimum requirements”; “conciliation with Castro implies that the United States talks with him, and the fact that the United States wants to talk with Castro will free him from the serious concerns that work in our favor”; “U.S. public opinion will not support conciliation with Castro”; “in case we reconcile with Castro and he betrays us, we would be in a pitiful predicament (especially in public terms)” and “even though conciliation with Castro is a real alternative, now is not the right time.”[34]
This document is very important, because it reflects very clearly the ideas that were moving in the narrow circle of Kennedy collaborators where the initiative to approach Cuba was known. In this memo Chase stated: “Our position, not to say our words, should convey the following: ‘Fidel, we are willing to let events take their current course. We intend to maintain, and where possible, increase our pressure against him to overthrow him and we are more than confident that we will succeed. In addition, he may forget to get “another Cuba” in the hemisphere. We have learned our lesson and we will not allow “another Cuba.” However, as reasonable people, we do not go after their head nor do we enjoy the suffering of the Cuban people. You know what our main concerns are: the link with the Soviets and subversion. If you believe you are in a position to allay such concerns, we can probably find a way to coexist amicably and build a prosperous Cuba. If you think you can’t cope with our worries, then forget about it; We have no problem maintaining the current situation. At the same time, you may want to keep in mind that while we will always be interested in your views on the link with the Soviets and Cuban subversion, we obviously cannot tell you at this time that we will always be willing to negotiate with you on the same terms.”[35] In conclusion, Chase noted that “A discreet rapprochement with Castro brings numerous advantages. First, a rapprochement would clearly show Castro that he has an alternative that he may not be sure exists, namely living with the United States on U.S. terms. Secondly, even if he rejected our offer, we would learn a lot.” [36]
Footnotes
[1]Arthur M. Schlesinger, Ob. Cit, p. 728.
[2] Quoted by Ibid., pp.734-735.
[3]Donovan coordinated between August and the end of December 1962 – the talks concluded on December 21 – the release of the Bay of Pigs prisoners in exchange for a payment from the United States government of 62 million dollars in food and medicine for children in six months. At the beginning of 1963 he continued his trips to Havana to achieve the release of a score of US citizens, including 3 CIA operatives, imprisoned in Cuba.
[4] But the reality was that no fewer than 14 U.S. federal agencies, including the CIA, were involved in the disbursement of funds that were used for the acquisition of products to be delivered to Cuba, in exchange for the release of the Bay of Pigs prisoners.
[5] Oscar Pino Santos, Complot, Editorial Nuestro Tiempo, S.A., Mexico, p.23.
[6]Tomás Diez Acosta, Los últimos 12 meses de J.F.Kennedy y la Revolución Cubana, Editora Política, Havana, 2011, p.175.
[7] Ibid., p.184.
[8] Ibid.
[9] Memorandum from Gordon Chase to Bundy, April 11, 1963, declassified documents,www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/, (Internet), (STI translation)
[10]Peter Kornbluh, “JFK and Castro: The Secret Quest for Accomodation”, in: Cigar Aficionado, September-October, 1999.
[11] Tomás Diez Acosta, Ob.Cit, p.85.
[12] Lisa Howard was one of the first women to have her own television show in the United States. Before venturing into journalism, she had been an actress. In 1960 he conducted the first major interview with Soviet Premier Nikita Khruschev, which was seen in the United States. She was later hired by ABC television.
[13]Peter Kornbluh and William M. Leogrande, “Talking with Castro”, in: Cigar Aficionado, Febrary, 2009.
[14]Richard Helms Memorandum to McCone, May 1, 1963, Declassified Documents,www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/, (Internet), (STI translation)
[15] Memorandum from CIA Lieutenant General Marshall S. Carter to Attorney General Robert Kennedy, May 2, 1963, declassified documents, Robert Kennedy Papers, http://www.jfklibrary.org/About-Us/News-and-Press/Press-Releases/2012-10-11-RFK-Papers-Released.aspx, (Internet).
[16] Peter Kornbluh, Ob.Cit.
[17] As Dr. Tomás Diez Acosta points out in his book The Last 12 Months of J.F. Kennedy and the Cuban Revolution, perhaps the delay in initiating practical steps of rapprochement with Cuba was linked to the fear of “information leaks,” rather to “a “gray” intelligence action executed by the elements within the government of the United States opposed any attempt to rapprochement with Cuba.” But U.S. documentation also shows that the CIA was adamantly opposed to a deal with Cuba and the State Department was less enthusiastic about the idea than President Kennedy himself.
[18] Prior to that, Attwood had been editor of Look magazine and interviewed Fidel Castro in 1959.
[19] Peter Kornbluh, Ob.Cit
[20] Quoted by Piero Gleijeses, in: Misiones en Conflict. Havana, Washington and Africa 1959-1976, Editorial de Ciencias Sociales, Havana, 2004, pp. 42-43.
[21]Remarks by William Atwood before the United States Senate. Commission of Inquiry into government operations related to intelligence activities. Washington DC. Thursday, July 10, 1975,www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/, (Internet), (Translation of ESTI)
[22] Interview with Carlos Lechuga on October 3, 2008.
[23]Memorandum from William Attwood to Gordon Chase, November 8, 1963,www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/, (Internet), (Translation from ESTI)
[24] “From the Report of our representative at the UN”, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Raúl Roa, to the President of the Republic, Osvaldo Dorticós, Havana, September 25 and 26, 1963. (Minrex Central Archive)
[25]Remarks by William Atwood before the United States Senate. Commission of Inquiry into government operations related to intelligence activities. Washington DC. Thursday, July 10, 1975,www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/, (Internet), (Translation of ESTI)
[26] Ibid.
[27]Memorandum from William Attwood to Gordon Chase, November 8, 1963,www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/, (Internet), (Translation from ESTI)
[28] Ibid.
[29] Peter Kornbluh, Ob.Cit.
[30] Remarks by William Atwood before the United States Senate. Commission of Inquiry into government operations related to intelligence activities. Washington DC. Thursday, July 10, 1975,www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/, (Internet), (Translation of ESTI)
[31]Memorandum for the Record by McGeorge Bundy, November 12, 1963,www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/, (Internet), (Translation of ESTI).
[32] Quoted by Peter Kornbluh, Ob.Cit.
[33]Memorandum from William Attwood to Gordon Chase, November 22, 1963,www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/, (Internet) (STI translation)
[34]Memorandum from Gordon Chase to Bundy, November 12, 1963,www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/, (Internet) (STI translation)
[35] Ibid.
[36] Ibid.
The Cuban Window 